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STALE REAL ESTATE COVENANTS
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
ABSTRACT

Since the 1970s, covenants running with the land have tethered a
large majority of the new housing units produced in the United
States. These private restraints usually continue for generations,
until a majority or supermajority of covenant beneficiaries affirmatively vote to amend or terminate them. Covenants interact with
public land use controls, particularly zoning ordinances. Zoning
politics tends to freeze land uses in urban America, particularly in
existing neighborhoods of single-family homes. This Article investigates to what extent covenants exacerbate the zoning freeze. It
provides a history of the use of private covenants and suggests how
drafters, judges, and legislators might address the risk that covenants will become obsolete.

* Walter E. Meyer Professor Emeritus of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. I
thank, without implicating, Susan French, Andrew Kull, and Carol Rose.
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INTRODUCTION

Private restrictive covenants certainly may have benefits, but
they reduce the dynamism of American real estate markets. When
choosing to alter an existing land use, a landowner must comply
with both a valid private covenant and a valid public enactment,
such as a zoning ordinance.' In other work, I have induced that the
politics of local zoning tends to freeze land uses in urban America. 2
The zoning straitjacket commonly is tightest in a developed neighborhood of single-family dwellings.3 Private covenants can add to
the tightness. Many covenants undoubtedly generate value, particularly when a restricted development is young. As covenants age,
however, they are likely to become outmoded. Both state courts and
state legislatures have recognized the need to loosen the grip of covenants after decades have passed. This Article analyzes the problem
of aging covenants and provides advice to the attorneys who draft
covenants, the judges who decide covenant cases, and state legislators.
Covenants come in two basic forms: negative restrictions on the
use ofland and affirmative obligations to perform a duty, especially
that of paying an assessment to a homeowners association. In 2018,
the Community Association Institute (CAl) estimated that at least
61 percent of new dwellings produced in the United States came
laden with covenants.4 That estimate included only dwellings in
common-interest communities (CICs), that is, those in which covenants imposed a duty to pay an assessment. 6 In some additional real

1. See Maureen E. Brady, Turning Neighbors into Nuisances, 134 HARv. L. REV. 1609,

1673 (2021); M. T. Van Heeke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds, 37 YALE L.J.
407, 413-14 (1928).
2. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Straitjacket: The Freezing of American
Neighborhoods of Single-Family Houses, 96 IND. L.J. 395, 396 (2021).
3. See id. at 397.
4. See FOUND. FOR CMTY. Ass'N RsCH., THE COMMUNITY AsSOCIATION FACT BoOK FOR
2018 11 (2018), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/FB_Narrative_
2018. pdf [https://perma.cc/F5SA-H48J]. CAl has an incentive to inflate its numbers. See
generally EvAN MCKENZIE, PRivATOPIA: HOMEOWNER AsSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GoVERNMENT 106-120 (1994) (skeptically appraising CAl's activities).
5. See FOUND. FOR CMTY. Ass'N RsCH., supra note 4, at 11.
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estate ventures, negative covenants restrict an owner's choices
among land uses.
Covenants restricting land uses first appeared in the United
States in the early nineteenth century. 6 During the first half of the
twentieth century, they gained notoriety as a mechanism for the
exclusion ofhouseholds from neighborhoods on the basis of race and,
less commonly, religion. In 1948, the Supreme Court famously held
in Shelley v. Kraemer that courts could not enforce those particular
sorts of restrictions. 7 The Court's decision, however, did not forbid
covenants that limit an owner's choices among land uses and building designs.8 Since Shelley, restrictions of those sorts have become
ubiquitous.
I. TwO SNAPSHOTS

In the United States, declarations of covenants lie in thousands
of local land-records offices. 9 This scattering has discouraged research into what the documents provide. To provide an overview of
the modest amount of current knowledge, this Part first describes
how covenants in Hancock Park, a famous subdivision in Los
Angeles, generated what came to be known as the "Dead Mile." It
then briefly depicts prevailing covenant practices in the twenty-first
century. Because I focus on the freezing ofland uses in a residential
neighborhood, I emphasize how long a negative or affirmative covenant can bind an owner ofland.
6. See, e.g., RoBERTM. FOGELSON, BoURGEOIS NIGHTMARES: SUBURBIA, 1870-1930 (2005);
Brady, supra note 1, at 1617-23.
7. See 334 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1948); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251, 253, 260

(1953) (denying remedy of damages). On the prior popularity of racial covenants, see generally

TOM C. CLARK & PHILIP B. PERLMAN, PREJuDICE AND PROPERTY: AN HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST

RACIAL COVENANTS (1948); RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE CoVENANTS, LAW, AND SoCIAL NORMS (2013) (arguing that

racial covenants, even if unenforceable, might continue to affect who lives in a neighborhood).
8. These constraints also can exclude by race. See Li.or Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary
Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006); Christopher Berry, Land
Use Regulation and Residential Segregation: Does Zoning Matter?, 3 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 251
(2001) (finding no significant difference in residential racial segregation between Houston and

Dallas, and attributing this result to potency of covenants in Houston).
9. See, e.g., Martin Johnson, Restrictive Covenants to Be Removed from Virginia Land
Records, VA. REALTORS, https://virginiarealtors.org/2020/07/24/restri.cti.ve-covenants-to-be-

removed-from-virginia-land-records/ [https:l/perma.cc/8VQ7-VDC7].
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A. Hancock Park: Los Angeles in the 1920s

Downtown Los Angeles, originally sited where its residents could
readily access fresh water, lies fifteen miles east of the Pacific
Ocean. One of Greater Los Angeles's major thoroughfares, Wilshire
Boulevard, runs due west from downtown towards the ocean
beaches. During the 1920s, a decade in which the population of the
City of Los Angeles doubled, G. Allen Hancock subdivided Hancock
Park, a rectangular tract of almost one-square mile. The rectangle's
southern border was Wilshire Boulevard. 10 Hancock sought to create
a high-end neighborhood ofhouses. 11 He imposed covenants that ran
with each of the lots, restricting most of them to only single-family
residential use and a minimum lot size of 15,000 square feet. As was
common in California at the time, Hancock also banned residency
by nonwhites. 12 His covenants set an explicit expiration date,
January 1, 1970. 13 Hancock, unlike a handful of pioneering 1920s
developers, did not establish a common-interest community (CIC)
to govern Hancock Park. Many residents apparently now wish that
he had. Competing neighborhood associations have arisen within
Hancock Park, although none has the power to compel homeowners
to pay an assessment.14
As the decades passed, public works departments substantially
widened Wilshire Boulevard. Lots abutting that thoroughfare
became too noisy to serve as an ideal site for a single-family use.
10. More precisely, the south side of the Hancock Park rectangle abuts Wilshire Bou-

levard; the west side, Highland Avenue; the north side, Melrose Avenue; and the east side,

Rossmore Avenue. See RUTH WALLACH, MIRACLE MILE IN Los ANGELES: HISTORY AND
ARCHITECTURE 34 (2013).

11. See Bolotin v. Rindge, 41 Cal. Rptr. 376, 377 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
12. Let My People Go ... to Hancock Park, JEWISHJ. (Apr. 9, 2014), https://jewishjournal.
comlmobile_20111212/128273/ [https://perma.cc/F979-DLC2]. In the 1920s, California courts
were willing to enforce racial restrictions on the identity of occupants, but not of land transferees. See LA Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596, 597-98 (Cal. 1919). There are hints that, in the
1920s, California subdividers especially favored racial covenants that restricted occupancy

by Black people. See HELEN C. MONCHOW, THE USE OF DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DE-

VELOPMENT 47-50 (1928) (reporting that racial restrictions were present in ten out of eleven
California developments, compared to, in other states, thirty-one out of seventy-three).
13. See Bolotin, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
14. In 1948, residents of Hancock Park first created an informal association, which began
asking neighbors to pay dues voluntarily. In 2005, a transient rival entered. See Hancock
Park Homeowners Ass'n Est. 1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Ass'n, No. CV 06-4584,
2006 WL 4532986, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006).
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Owners of Hancock Park lots abutting Wilshire brought several
lawsuits-some successful, some not-claiming that conditions had
so changed that courts should no longer enforce the single-familyuse restriction.'" Aware that the covenants would expire in 1970,
some owners of vacant lots simply chose to wait until that year, in
the hope that Los Angeles would then zone their lots for more intensive uses such as apartment buildings. 16 Prior to 1970, thus evolved
the Dead Mile on Wilshire, a stretch centered on Hancock Park. 17
The nickname highlights the differences between this underdeveloped stretch and Wilshire's so-called Miracle Mile, an auto-oriented
commercial strip just to the west. 18

15. Compare Bolotin, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (reversing trial court and holding that conditions had not sufficiently changed to bar enforcement), with Hirsch v. Hancock, 343 P.2d 959

(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (permitting an oil derrick to be used on Hancock Park lot).
16. See WALLACH, supra note 10, at 71.

17. See id. at 70-71.
18. See id. at 81-126.

2022]

STALE REAL ESTATE COVENANTS

1837

Figure 1. Wilshire Boulevard's Dead Mile in 1971, just after the
covenants expired. 19

How did Hancock's covenants interact with the City of Los Angeles's zoning?20 Los Angeles had designated "residence district[s]" as
early as 1910, well before New York City's more celebrated embrace
of zoning in 1916.21 In 1920, Los Angeles also became the U.S.
pioneer in the mapping of zones solely for single-family detached
19. Photograph of Undeveloped Lots on Wilshire Boulevard, in LOS ANGELES TIMES
COLLECTION (1971), https://digital.library.ucla.edu/catalog/ark:/21198/
zz0002nhwc [.https://perma.cd9DEF-G62V]. !Als Angeles Times Photograph Collection, Special
Collections, Charles E. YoUDg Research Library, UCLA. The view in the figure is to the west.
The white high-rise building in the distance stood at Wilshire Boulevard and South R.Unpau
Boulevard.
20. On the interaction of demand for the two devices, see Ron Cheung & Rachel Meltzer,
Hamwwn.ers Associations cmd the Demand for Local Land Use Regulation, 53 J. REG'L SCI.
611, 631 (2018) (finding that a greater number of CICs is associated with more local land use
regulation).
21. See Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 P. 714 (Cal. 1911); Gordon Whitnall, History of Zoning,
166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 1, 10-12 (1931). New York City's first zoning ordinance regulated building bulks, particularly heights, which Los Angeles's initial ordinance
did not. Id.
PHOTOGRAPHIC
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houses. 22 Yet Hancock correctly envisioned that city zoning, by itself, would not create the high-end neighborhood that he wanted to
offer. 23 A century after Hancock dreamed ofits creation, and long
after his covenants had expired in 1970, the core of Hancock Park
remains as he conceived it. 24 In 2020, the City of Los Angeles was
zoning most of the neighborhood for the sole use that Hancock's
covenants had permitted, a single-family detached house on a lot of
at least 15,000 square feet." 5 This minimum lot-size requirement
was three times greater than what Los Angeles was requiring in the
single-family neighborhood just east of Hancock Park. 26
In 2021, Trulia reported that a Hancock Park house on a lot of at
least 15,000 square feet had a median asking price of around $7
million. 27 Despite these astronomic values, market pressure to densify this now centrally located neighborhood is intense.28 The City
of Los Angeles has responded by rezoning some of the edges of
Hancock Park for commercial and multifamily uses. In 2020, these
rezonings represented about 5 percent of the neighborhood's total
area. 29 Along much of the neighborhood's frontage along Wilshire
Boulevard, zoning now allows commercial or multifamily uses,
22. Whitnall, supra note 21, at 12.
23. In the 1920s, Hancock also may have recognized that covenants were more reliable
than zoning in furthering his goal of restricting occupancy by nonwhites. At the time, racial
zoning was unconstitutional, but racial covenants were not. Compare Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U .8. 60 (1917) (holding that racial zoning unconstitutionally impaired property rights),
with Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (holding private covenants did not entail state
action). For Corrigan's later demise, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. See CITY OF Los ANGELES, HANCOCK PARK i'RESERVATION PLAN 1-3 (2007), https1/
planning.lacity.org/odocument/cefc3a2c-c04b-443c-8d87 -6f46b48c048f/Hancock-ParkPreservation-Plan-Text_(no_cover).pdf [https://perma.cc/YD42-Y9MN]; see also WALLACH,
supra note 10, at 71.
25. See CITY OF LOS ANGELES, DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING: GENERALIZED SUMMARY
OF ZONING REGULATIONS 1 (2020), https:l/plsnning.lscity.org/ odocument/eadcb225·a16b·4ce6·
bc94-c915408c2b04/Zoning_Code_8ummary.pdf[https://perma.cc/PFS6-DX37] (identifying requirements ofRE15 zone).
26. In 2020, the city's zone in Hancock Park, RE15, required a minimum house-lot of
15,000 square feet. See id. Arden Boulevard, one block east of Rossmore Avenue, Hancock
Park's eastern boundary, then lay in Los Angeles's standard R1 zone, which required only
5,000-square-foot lots.
27. Search conducted on Trulia.com on December 1, 2021.
28. Elizabeth Fuller, Conversations About Densifying 'Wilshire Boulevard Heating Up,
LARcHMONT BUZZ (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.larchmontbuzz.com/featured-stories-larchmontvillagelconversation-densifying-wilshire-boulevard-heating/ [https://perm.a.ccJJ3U6-WKFU].
29. The estimate ignores the areas of the Wilshire Country Club and various schools.
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typically in structures less than four stories in height. In sum, covenants originally shaped land uses in Hancock Park, but after they
had expired in 1971, zoning largely took over the task of freezing 95
percent of the neighborhood.
B. The Rise of Common-Interest Communities

The developer of a common-interest community, which Hancock
Park is not, compels each purchaser to become a member of a private homeowners association and pay a periodic assessment to that
entity. 30 In 1844, four purchasers of a Boston farm created the first
CIC in the United States, Louisburg Square in the Beacon Hill
neighborhood."' In that instance, owners of twenty-eight townhouses
abutting a small park agreed to pay mandatory fees to maintain the
park. Louisburg Square endures as an institution, evidence that
covenants may produce value for centuries.
Nationally known CIC developments of recent vintage include
the New Urbanist communities of Celebration and Seaside in Florida, and Kentlands in Maryland. 82 Residential structures in these
communities vary and include detached single-family houses, townhouses, and higher-rise apartments and condominiums. Property
owners, not tenants, elect the members of the executive board that
governs the CIC association.•• Covenants typically empower the
board to adopt and enforce rules governing member conduct, and to

30. The key judicial decision upholding the power of a CIC to impose mandatory assess-

ments is NeponsitProperty Owners'Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1938).
31. URB. LAND INST., THE HOMESAsSOC!ATION HANDBOOK 40, 42 fig.4·B (1964) (indicating

the layout). A private trust, not a CIC, governs Manhattan's Gramercy Park, established a
decade earlier than Louisburg Square. See id. at 39.

32. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
33. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1539-63 (1982). Tbe Unilorm CommonlnterestOwnershipAct (UCIOA) (rev. 2008) uses executive board to refer to the board in charge. UNIF. CoMMON INT. 0WNERSEITPACT § 1-103(18}
(NAT'L CONF. COMM'Rs UNIF. STATE L. 2008). Chapter 6 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFPEoPERTY: SERVITUDES (AM. L. INBT. 2000) recommends a special set of rules to govern CICs.
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collect assessments to finance maintenance of the CIC's common
property, such as recreation facilities and open space. 34 So thoroughgoing are board enterprises in Celebration and Seaside that resi ·
dents in both have declined to incorporate as municipalities. 36
The Community Associations Institute represents CICs, which it
claims contain a solid majority of new dwellings. CAl surveys assert
that in 2017, as mentioned, CICs accounted for 61 percent of new
housing units built in the United States. 36 There have been few
studies of what CIC covenants typically provide. Susan French and
Wayne Hyatt, two noted legal experts, credibly assert that the
"[m]odern documents" of a CIC typically handle the issue of covenant life in the following manner. 37 The declaration of covenants
specifies an initial term, perhaps twenty-five to fifty years. The
covenants then automatically renew for a shorter term, commonly
ten years, unless opponents of renewal, by majority or supermajority vote, affirmatively vote to amend or terminate them. Specialists
refer to this system as automatic renewal with opt-out. This nowstandard approach stacks the deck in favor of the continuation of
covenants. Unless loosened, these restrictions, coupled with zoning
restrictions and historic preservation regulations, threaten to freeze
land uses in urban America.

34.

See

WAYNE 8. HYATI', CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER AsSOCIATION PRACTICE:

COMMUNITY AsSOCIATION LAW 7-28 (3d ed. 2000) (reviewing a variety of CIC forms). On the
potential power of CICs in local politics, see ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD PoLITICS:
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY AsSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GoVERNANCE 104-30 (1992).
35. See Celebration, Florida, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 23, 2021), https:l/en.wikipedia.orglwikil Ce!
ebration,_Florida [https:l/perma.cc/N6BE-G3XB]; Andn\s Duany, The Celebration Controversies, NEW URBANISM (2004), https:/lwww.webnet.com/celebration-duany.htm [https:l/perma.cc/
V3RL-C2QZ]; Seaside, Florida, WIKIPEDIA (July 29, 2021), https:l/en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Sea
side,_Flori.da [https://perma.cc/G5L2-79V5]; K£ntlands, Gaithersburg, Maryland, WIKIPEDIA
(July 4, 2021), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!Kentlands,_Gaithersburg~Maryland [https:l/
perma.cc/2WRP-Q3E7].
36. FoUND. FOR CMTY. Ass'N Rscs., supra note 4, at 11.
37. WAYNE S. HYNrr & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY AsSOCIATION LAw: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CoMMON INTEREST GoMMllNITIES 503 (2d ed. 2008); see also Susan F. French,
Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261,
1314 (1982).
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II. A HISTORY OF THE USE OF COVENANTS
Covenants can impose social costs, as racial covenants unquestionably did. Nonetheless, as pioneering developers realized, private
restrictions also can confer tangible social benefits. Especially prior
to the advent of zoning in the 1910s, urban homebuyers were
uncertain about what the future would bring. A next-door neighbor
might install an industrial facility, funeral parlor, or high-rise
apartment building that courts would not deem noxious enough to
constitute a nuisance. In Chicago, for example, con artists used a
"livery stable scam" to shake down neighbors."8 Some residential
developers therefore began to employ covenants to assure buyers
that a new development would be free of nonresidential uses. 39
Many early developers, including Allen Hancock, went farther and
imposed covenants to restrict land uses in their developments to
single-family dwellings. 40 In the 1920s, many public officials followed the same practice and mapped single-family-only zones, an
approach that the City of Los Angeles invented. 41

38. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of "Nature's Metropolis".: The Historical
Contextoflllirwis'Unique Zoning Standards,12N.lLL. U.L.REV. 527,569-70 (1992); Daniel
B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1645-46 (2011).
39. In Monchow's sample, about 80 percent of the covenant schemes permitted only

residential uses. See MONCHOW, supra note 12, at 28-31. In suburban Wisconsin, Zile found
an even higher percentage, 86 percent. See Zigurds L. Zile, Private Zoning on Milwaukee's
Metropolitan Fringe: Problems of Draftin~Part II, 1959 WIS. L. REV. 451, 464.
40. Covenants permitted only single-family units in 63 percent ofMonchow's sample, and
in 74 percent of Zile's. See MONCHOW, supra note 12, at 28-31; Zile, supra note 39, at 471.
Prior to the mid-twentieth century. if a state court deemed covenants ambiguous, it tended
to interpret them to permit multifamily dwellings. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 90 A. 649, 650
(Pa. 1914) (''[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the restriction and in favor of the free and
unrestricted use ofthe property."). The Pennsylvania court accordingly interpreted a covenant
allowing a "dwelling house" to enable construction of an apartment building. Id. at 649-50.
See generally Brady, supra note 1, at 1644-53.
41. See supra text accompanying note 22. A study that I carried out found that suburbs
restrict 91 percent of their residentially zoned land only to single-family detached dwellings.
Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater
New Haven, and GreoJ.er Austin, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1622 (2021).
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A. The Crudeness of Early Covenants

During the 1920s, and sometimes even later, many state courts
viewed covenants with hostility. 42 They inherited this bias partly
from English common law. English common law lacked a general
system ofland records. Its courts rightly worried that the spread of
enforceable restrictive covenants would surprise many purchasers
of burdened land. 43 In the United States, by contrast, states have
long mandated that local governments operate land records sys·
terns. The United States' recording system enables title-insurance
companies to assure land purchasers against the sorts of surprises
that had worried English courts. AB the twentieth century progressed, most state courts overcame their initial hostility to covenants
and increasingly warmed to their potential. 44
Even as late as the 1950s, the drafting of covenants tended to be
amateurish. 46 Two basic problems recurred. First, drafters of covenants tended to be casual in identifying both the lot owners bound
by the restrictions and those entitled to enforce them. Instead of
prerecording a general declaration of covenants, the developer of a
large subdivision might include covenants only in some deeds. 46
Some courts eventually tidied up these messes, perhaps unsoundly,
by concluding, in some instances, that a "general plan" of covenants
had burdened and benefited all lots.'7 As the twentieth century
progressed, this problem lessened. By mid-century, both state and
42. See, e.g., Johnson, 90 A. at 660.
43. Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Gouern.ingLand, 38J.LEGALSTUD. 89 (2009).Butcf. Tulkv. Moxhay,2 Phillips 774,41 Eng. Rep.
1143 (Chap. 1848) (enforcing negative covenant as an equitable servitude).
44. See, e.g., Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky. 1958) ("Under the modem view,
building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the public
rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies."); Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887 (Ohio 1929); see also
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 7, at 3.

45. Zigurds Zile concluded that the covenants he examined, mostly imposed in the 1950s,

were generally poor in quality. Zile, supra note 39, at 483.
46. See MONCHOW, supra note 12, at 14-15.

47. The leading case is Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1926). Other courts reject

this doctrine on the ground that it jeopardizes the interests of purchasers who rely on the
integrity of land records. See, e.g., Riley v. Bear Creek Plan. Comm., 551 P.2d 1213 (Cal.

1976); Houghton v. Rizzo, 281 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1972). See generally RgsTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.14 (AM. L. INST. 2000) (reviewing the mixed case law).
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local governments had greatly increased the formality of their
subdivision regulations. Once more formal regulations existed, a
developer's attorney could record, prior to the sale of the first subdivision lot, an overarching declaration of covenants that clarified
the lots burdened and benefited.
Second, drafters of early covenants tended to be cavalier about
how long the scheme of covenants would last. The approach that
currently is predominant--automatic renewal with opt-out--was not
concocted until the early twentieth century!" Prior to its invention,
drafters of covenants took a variety of approaches to covenant life.
Some specified a fixed termination date, perhaps twenty-five or fifty
years in the future. A few explicitly stated that the covenants were
to be perpetual. Most commonly, however, a drafter would simply
fail to address the issue of covenant length, thereby implying that
the restrictions were to last forever. This sloppiness forced courts,
as early as the late nineteenth century, to develop doctrines terminating covenants.<•

B. Key Innovators Who Shaped Covenant Practices
Three individuals and two institutions made major contributions
to the evolution of U.S. covenant practices. The first was the littleheralded Edward H. Bouton of the Roland Park Company, a Baltimore land-developmentfirm. 5°For site planning, Bouton's company
frequently hired the firm of the prominent landscape architect
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. 51 Between 1891 and 1931, Bouton used
covenants at several notable Baltimore subdivisions, all of which
evolved into common-interest communities. 52 Bouton notably experimented with each of the four basic options for limiting the life of a
covenant."3 He first tried perpetual covenants. Because human
foresight plainly is limited, Bouton soon cast aside this approach,
48. See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 127-48 and accompanying text.
50. See URB. LAND INsT., supra note 31, at 43-46. Bouton receives mention in Garrett

Power, The Unwisdom of Allowing City Growth to Work out Its Own Destiny, 47 MD. L. REv.
626, 650-54 (1988).
51. URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 43. Olmsted, Jr. had a yet more famous father.
52. ld. at 43-46.
53. Id. at 43.
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just as both courts and legislatures would come to frown on it. Next,
Bouton tried flxed·term covenants. That approach required him to
select a precise ending date, despite the uncertain nature of future
events. 54 Third, Bouton turned to authorizing purchasers in his
developments, by plebiscite, to determine covenant length. He
initially specified that the covenants were to terminate at a fixed
date, but authorized lot owners to vote affirmatively to extend them.
This approach assumed that, when covenants were valuable, mem·
hers would be able to overcome the collective action problems that
would make it difficult to keep them in place. In 1924, Bouton used
a fourth approach at his Homeland development: covenants auto·
matically renewed for successive periods of years unless opponents
ever mobilized enough votes to end or amend them. 55 As noted, this
technique-automatic renewal with opt·out--has become stan·
dard. 56
Bouton's subdivision designs and artfulness with covenants
influenced other American developers. 57 Bouton mentored the
second individual notable in the history of covenants, J.C. Nichols,
someone twenty years younger. Nichols began development of
Kansas City's Country Club District in 1905."8 The development
proved a huge success, cementing Nichols's national prominence. In
1929, more than a decade after the advent of zoning, Nichols
published a ringing endorsement of the continuing utility of cove·
nant restrictions. 59 Like Bouton, Nichols experimented with various
54. See French, supra note 37, at 1316 n.255 (referring to fixed time limits as "completely

arbitrary").

55. URB. LAND INST., supra nnte 31, at 43.
56. See supra text following note 37.
57. Bouton influenced, among others, the Van Sweringen brothers, developers of the

famed Shaker Heights, Ohio. See HERBERT H. HARWOOD, JR., INviBmLE GIANTS: THE EMPffiES
OF CLEVELAND'S VAN SWERINGEN BROTHERS 15·17 (2003). On Shaker Heights, see JOHN R.
STiLGoE, BoRDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB, 1820-1939, at 239-51 (1988);

Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivisions:
The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE W. RBRV. L. REV. 617
(2001); Dixon v. Van Swerin- Co., 166 N.E. 887 (Ohio 1929).
58. URB. LAND INBT., supra note 31, at 51-54; see also McKENZIE, supra note 4, at 38-43

(discussing Nichols). At several developments, Nichols imposed covenants to bar occupancy
or ownership by Black people. See MONCHOW, supra note 12, at 47, 60.
69. ''I believe practically all subdividers agree that zoning, as desirable as it is for cities
as a whole, cannot, at least for the present, supplant all the advantages gained by the use of
deed restrictions." J.C. Nichols, A Developer's Vtew of Deed Restrictions, 5 J. LAND & PuB.
Um.. ECON. 132, 142 (1929). But cf. EoWARD M. BAsSETT, ZONING 317, 324 (Nat1 Mun. Rev.
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approaches to the lifespan of covenants. 60 Several sources identify
Nichols as the inventor of automatic renewal with opt-out. 61 By the
mid-1920s, both Bouton and Nichols were regularly employing the
approach.
The 1930s saw the creation of two institutions that have greatly
influenced covenant practices. The first was the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), a New Deal agency established in 1934."2
FHA provides mortgage insurance, protecting lenders from borrower
defaults. Its underwriting policies have greatly influenced how
covenants are used. During its early decades, FHA favored developments of single-family detached houses in low-density neighborhoods and frowned on the mixing of different land uses. 62 By 1938,
the agency was recommending that covenants have an initial term
of at least twenty-five years. 64

Supp. 1922) (affirmatively favoring the use of covenants, but only as a supplement to zoning).
60. In some early subdivisions, Nichols's company required lot owners to vote affirmatively to extend the prior term. See Strauss v. J. C. Nichols Land Co., 37 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.
1931) (sustaining legality of a vote-to-extend procedure). Nichols later switched to an opt-out,
or vote-to-terminate, approach. See, e.g., Maurer v. J. C. Nichols Co., 485 P.2d 174, 176 (Kan.
1971) (involving 1924 covenants that required owner opt-out at least five years prior to the
expiration of a term). Nichols later provided a rationale for why he had changed his mind:
With the greater protection to property through such automatic extension of
restrictions, particularly if they cover an area of considerable size, the original
restriction period need not be so long. Perhaps 25- to 30-year periods are long
enough to give reasonable assurance and yet short enough to permit readjustment of restrictions to changing modes of life.
Nichols, supra note 59, at 135.
61. See FoGE:r..goN, supra note 6, at 108-09; URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 51. But cf
supra note 60.
62. See generally MARC A. WEISS, THE RisE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS 141-58 (1987).
63. Enlightened opinion at the time favored the separation of different land uses. See
Andrew Whittemore, How the Federal Government Zoned America: The Federal Housing
Administration and Zoning, 39 J. URB. HrsT. 620, 626, 630 (2012) (noting that FHA policies
had supported the segregation of land uses and had promoted low-density, single-family
detached housing); see also Thomas Adams, The Design of Residential Areas: Basic Considerations, Principles, and Methods, in VI HARVARD CITY PLANNING SERIES 89 (Henry Vincent
Hubbard ed., 1934) (asserting that a detached house "is the best type for most people").
64. FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWBITING MANuAL § 980(3) (1938). During the New Deal,
FHA notoriously supported the use of racially restrictive covenants. See id. at § 980(3)(g)
(favoring "[p]rohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are
intended"). In 1947, the agency dropped that explicit policy. BROOKS & RoSE, supra note 7, at
108-09, 170-71.
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In 1936, J.C. Nichols helped found the Urban Land Institute
(ULI), a nonprofit specializing in issues of development policy. 65 In
1947, both the FHA and ULI explicitly endorsed automatic renewal
with owner opt-out every ten years or so. 66 In that year, both institutions published sample forms for covenants that included an
identical paragraph on the issue of covenant length. 67 ULI likely
copied the FHA version. 68 The federal agencies that regulate
financial institutions encourage lawyers for developers to use boilerplate documents when creating covenants. 69 During the postwar
homebuilding boom, attorneys relied heavily on the FHA-ULI form.
A Westlaw search in 2020 uncovered 115 reported judicial decisions,
overwhelmingly by state courts, that quote the exact words that the
two institutions had offered to govern the extension of covenants. 70
65. History, URB. LAND INST. (2021), https://testing.uli.org/aboutlhistory/ [https://perma.
cc/Q54V·9LQN].
66. See URB. LAND INST., COMMUNITY BUILDERS HANDBOOK 167·70 (1947) (reproducing
"Protective Covenants Recommended" by FHA); FED. Hous.ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANuAL
§ 1364(1) (1947) (recommending an initial tenn at least as long as the term of FHA mortgage
insurance, and an automatic renewal term of ten years). The term of an FilA-insured mortgage averaged twenty-one years in 1946-1954. See Edward J. Pinto, Housing Finance Fact or
Fiction? FHA Pioneered the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage During the Great Depression?, AM.
ENTER. INST. (June 24, 2015), https://www.aei.orgleconomicslhousin.g-(mance/housin.g-(mancefact-or-fiction-fha-pioneered-the-30-year-fixed-rate-mortgage-during-the-great-depressionl
[https://penna.cc/722Q-GL4Z].
67.
These Covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and
all persons claiming under them until January 1, 19_ [twenty-five year period],
at which time said Covenants shall be automatically extended for successive
periods of 101 years unless by vote of a majority of the then owners of the lots it
is agreed to change said covenants in whole or in part.
URB. LAND INST., supra note 66, at 167 (emphasis added). Footnote 1 reads, "some developers
recommend not less than 25 years." Id. The 1964 version of the ULI Handbook repeated the
italicized words quoted above, but added the requirement that at least two-thirds of the
membership approve any amendment to the covenant scheme. See URB. LAND INST., supra
note 31, at 392.
68. The FHA Underwriting Manual of January 194 7 had endorsed automatic renewal
with opt-out.
69. JamesL. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings ofPromissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 1, 58-59
nn.244-45.
70. The search, conducted on February 16, 2020, employed the phrase, "Covenants shall
be automatically extended for successive periods of." Of the 115 decisions, in 107, drafters
had chosen ten years as the length of the renewal period, three had chosen less than ten
years, and five had chosen either twenty or twenty-five years. The 1964 version of the ULI
Handbook repeated the italicized words quoted in note 67, but added the requirement that
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A third important individual in the history of American covenant
law was Byron R. Hanke. Hanke served as FHA's national Director
of Land Planning from 1946 to 1972. 71 In the decades after World
War II, Hanke fought against then-popular subdivision practices,
such as the creation of rectangular house-lots situated within a grid
of streets. 72 He came to favor not single-use zones, but Planned Unit
Development (PUD) zoning that would enable the mixing of different land uses. 73 In the 1960s, FHA detailed Hanke to work for
ULI. The upshot was the publication of ULI's Homes Association
Handbook in 1964. 74 This volume quickly became the bible of creators of mandatory-membership common-interest communities.
Mter 1970, the number of CICs in the United States skyrocketed. 75
The rising popularity of condominium ownership, an option generally not available in the United States prior to the 1960s, helped
fuel the boom. 76
III. COVENANTS HAVE VALUE, BUT DECLINING VALUE OVER TIME

The many supporters of covenants were clear-eyed about their
benefits, but underplayed the downsides of aging covenants.
Scholarly studies affirm that covenants can usefully constrain a
landowner's choices among land uses and building designs. 77 In
at least two-thirds of the membership approve any amendment to the covenant scheme. See

URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 392.
71. Who Is Byron Hanke?, FoUND. FORCMTY.Ass'NRscH., https://foundation.caionline.org/
scholarships/recent-fellowship-recipients/hanke_bio/ [https://perma.cc/FP7P-8GLM].
72. See Byron R. Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA.

L. REV. 15, 16 (1965).
73. Id. at 17-18. Hanke'sarti.cleappearedaspartofa symposiumonPUDs. See 114 U.PA.
L. REv. 3-170 (1965). Publication of the symposium helped promote use of the PUD device,
which lately has fallen into decline because some suburbs regard it as overly pro-development.
74. URB. LAND INST., supra note 31. The volume identifies Hanke, whose name appears
first on the authors' page, as "Study Director and Land Planner." ld. The Handbook lists Jan
Krasnowiecki, another major contributor, as ''Legal Counsel." ld. Krasnowiecki then was a
member of the University of Pennsylvania law faculty.
75. See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 61-62 (1991).

76. ld.

77. Richard Brooks and Carol Rose, authors of a book critical of racial covenants, agree
that nonracial covenants potentially have utility. BROOKS & RoSE, supra note 7, at 92, 101-02;
see also William T. Hughes, Jr. & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Restrictive Land Covenants, 12 J.
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 9, 19-20 (1996) (lauding potential of covenants); MONCHOW, supra
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2019, economists Wyatt Clarke and Matthew Freedman, marshaling
data almost national in scope, published one of the most notable
contributions.'8 Controlling for other variables, Clarke and Freedman found that the presence of a CIC increased the value of a house
by about 8 percent when a development was new. 79 The authors also
found, however, that the premium decreased steadily over time and
had disappeared, on average, once a development was forty years
old. 80 Three other studies support the plausible intuition that the
value of covenants tends to erode over time. 81 But only on average.
Townhouse owners at Louisburg Square, established in 1844, today
undoubtedly would favor perpetuation of their association. 82
Why covenants can enhance property values, especially early on,
is hardly mysterious. A landowner's choices among land uses commonly generate both negative and positive externalities on neighbors. A variety of mechanisms can internalize these externalities,
including informal norms, nuisance litigation, and public regulations. Compared to these other alternatives, developer-imposed
covenants potentially have several advantages. 88 Builders can
employ covenants to market communities with distinctive attributes, analogous to Tiebout competition among suburban municipalities.84 Allen Hancock, for example, perceived that there would
be demand in Los Angeles for a high-end community of houses and,
at Hancock Park, employed covenants to deliver that product. 85
Covenants decentralize the creation ofland use restrictions from a
note 12, at 78 ("[S]ubdividers and purchasers are familiar with this method of control and feel
confident of its permanency and soundness.").
78. Wyatt Clarke & Matthew Freedman, The Rise and Effects of Homeowners Associations, 112 J. URB. ECON. 1 (2019) (examining only covenanted developments of single-family
houses).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id.
81. William T. Hughes, Jr. & Geoffrey K Turnbull, Uncertain Neighborhood Effects and
Restrictive Covenants, 39 J. URB. EcoN. 160, 171 (1996); Rachel Meltzer & Ron Cheung, How
Are Homeowners Associations Capitalized into Property Values?, 46 REG'L SCI. & URB. ECON.
93, 97 (2014); William H. Rogers, The Housing Price Impact of Covenant Restrictions and
Other Subdivision Characteristics, 40 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 203, 203-04 (2010).
82. See supra text accompanying note 31.
83. See Robert C. Ellickson,Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 711-19 (1973).
84. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
85. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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monopolist-in that instance, the City of Los Angeles--to entrepreneurs such as Hancock who operate on a more fine-grained level.
In the words of the Supreme Court of California, "common interest
developments are a more intensive and efficient form of land use
that greatly benefits society and expands opportunities for home
ownership." 86
Whether the Hancock Park covenants-even ignoring their odious racial exclusions-in fact would have survived a cost-benefit
analysis, however, is far from clear. On the positive side, an analyst
would include the enhancement of consumer choice among neighborhood ambiances. By establishing a CIC, a developer can credibly
promise the availability of specific facilities. These include not only
the commonplace, such as tennis courts and garden-like grounds,
but also the exotic, such as bandstands and sculpture gardens. The
resulting specialization of neighborhoods may enhance the bonding
social capital of eventual residents. 87 Enthusiasts of covenanted
communities, such as Fred Foldvary and Robert Nelson, stress these
potential upsides. 88
Covenants also, however, give rise to costs. Developers commonly
employ them with the intent of excluding certain people. 89 At Hancock Park, Allen Hancock wanted to keep out not only nonwhites,
but also middle-income households of any race. 90 The exclusiveness
of Hancock Park might add to the bonding social capital of its residents, but simultaneously reduces bridging social capital across
income groups in Los Angeles."'
In most instances, however, exclusionary zoning is a far more
serious problem than exclusionary covenants. Few covenant
86. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Viii. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1288 (Cal. 1994).
87.

See RoBERT D. PuTNAM, BoWLING ALoNE: THE CoLLAPSE AND REvivAL OF AMERICAN

CoMMUNITY 22-24 (2000) (distinguishing bonding and bridging social capital).
88. See FRED FoLDVARY, PuBLIC Goons AND PRivATE CoMMUNlTIES (1994); RoBERT H.
NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT(2005);
see also Drr.GER, supra note 34 (presenting a largely favorable assessment).
89. See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 (emphasizing possible racial motives that may underlie
a covenant scheme); Janet Furman Speyrer, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on Market
Values of Single-Family Homes in Houswn, 2 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 117, 128 (1989)
(expressing concern for groups that covenants may economically exclude).
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. One leading analyst implies that bridging social capital is especially valuable. See
PuTNAM, supra note 87, at 23, 358, 363; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities,
2004 U.lLL. L. REV. 829, 882-90 (discussing social capital in C!Cs).
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schemes bind more than 1 percent of the area of a municipality. 92 In
addition, as a symbolic matter, governmental pursuit of economic
segregation is more offensive than private pursuit of the same goal.
Indeed, in a leading Pennsylvania decision striking down large-lot
zoning, the court approvingly noted that landowners could employ
covenants to assure that lots are large. 93
Covenants can give rise to other sorts of costs. This Article emphasizes the collective action problem that covenant beneficiaries
may face when the restrictions become outmoded. 94 Covenants also
limit a landowner's freedom to choose among land uses and building designs. 95 Evan McKenzie, one of the severest critics of covenanted communities, emphasizes another potential downside. 96 In
his eyes, CICs, which allocate votes according to property ownership, tend to undermine traditions of democratic governance and
reduce involvement in the affairs of local governments. 97
Do the benefits of covenants exceed their costs? Clarke and Freedman, who did not give weight to covenants' subtler social effects,
assert that they increase home values, especially when they are
young. 98 Clay Gillette, a centrist observer, acknowledges that
covenants tend to foster homogeneous sorting. Partly in light of the
widespread human impulse, within the constraints of fair-housing
92. According to CAl's numbers, in 2018, a CIC of average size governed about eighty

housing units. See FOUND. FOR CMTY. Ass'N RsCH., supra note 4.

93.

An owner ofland may constitutionally make his property as large and as private

or secluded or exclusive as he desires and his purse can afford. He may, for
example, singly or with his neighbors, purchase suft"J.cient neighboring land to
protect and preserve by restrictions in deeds or by covenants inter se. the

privacy, a minimum acreage, the quiet, peaceful atmosphere and the tone and
character of the community which existed when he or they moved there.
Nat'! Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612-13 (Pa. 1965) (quoting Bilbar Constr. Co. v.
Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851, 867 (Pa. 1958) (dissenting opinion)).
94. See also GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL
COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 323-31 (3d ed. 2016).
95. Winokur, supra note 69, at 62-66.
96. MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 21-23. McKenzie later muted his objections. See EvAN
MCKENziE, BEYOND PRNATOPIA 118-19 (2011). Another work skeptical of private restrictions
is Co:M:MON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GoVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994). Gated communities, a minor fraction
of CICs, have drawn tbe sharpest criticism. See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER,
FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
97. MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 21-23.
98. Clarke & Freedman, supra note 78.
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legislation, to bond with others who are similar, however, he is unwilling to condemn covenanted communities across the board. 99 I
agree. The costs of exclusionary zoning, again, are far more serious
than the costs of exclusionary covenants.
In 1982, I published an article that strongly supported the potential of CICs as a decentralized source of land use regulation. 100
Since then, for two reasons, my enthusiasm has somewhat cooled.
First, it has become increasingly evident that the popularity of CICs
is not entirely market-driven. To placate fiscally selfish "homevoters,'' a local government commonly insists that a developer create a
ere to provide services, such as street cleaning and trash collection,
which the government provides without charge in older neighborhoods.101 This has come to be known as the "offloading'' of costs to
CICs. 102 Second, as Lee Fennell and Paula Franzese have persuasively demonstrated, legal doctrines compel many CICs to be overly
inflexible. 103 A famous California decision, now a staple of legal
education, held that a ere could enforce a no-pets policy against a
resident whose ''indoor cats" were highly unlikely ever to bother a
neighbor. 104 In that instance, attorneys might have advised the CIC
99. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375,
1398, 1441 (1994); Fennell, supra note 91, also offers a centrist perspective.
100. See Ellickson, supra note 33; see also Ellickson, supra note 83, at 711-19.
101. See Gerald Komgold, Cutting Municipal Services During Fiscal Crisis: Lessons from
the Denial of Services to Condominium and Homeowner Association Owners, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 109, 110-14 (2012). On the notion of "Homevoters," see WILLIAM A.

FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LoCAL GoVERNMENT

TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
102. See Ron Cheung, The Interaction Between Public and Private Governments: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 63 J. URB. ECON. 885, 885-86 (2008) (on offioadingpractices in California).
103. Fennell, supra note 91, at 849-64, 891-95; Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a VUlage?
Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 4 7 VILL. L. REV. 553,
555 (2002). A large literature develops this theme. See, e.g., Charles E. Fraser, Condo Commandos: An Abuse of Power?, in TRENDS AND INNOVATIONS IN MASTER-PLANNED COMMUNITIES
46 (1998) (asserting that male residents aged seventy and older have disproportionate power
on CrC boards); MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 41, 131-32; NELSON, supra note 88, at 118-21
(noting, however, at 121, that a 1999 survey found that only 8 percent of ere members
deemed their rules to be either 4'not appropriate at all" or "somewhat inappropriate"); Gerald
Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between Traditional Family

Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 951, 951-55 (1989).
104. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Viii. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994). A subsequent

California statute provides that no covenant in a ere imposed after 2000 can bar an owner
from having at least one pet. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 715 (West 2020). This prospectively overrode

Nahrstedt.
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board that a failure to enforce the no-pets policy might lead to a
judicial holding that it had waived the covenant. 105 Today, indoor
cats; tomorrow, pit bulls. I nonetheless continue to regard covenants, particularly when they are new, as potentially cost-justified
land use controls.
IV. THREE ACTORS WHO CAN ELIMINATE STALE COVENANTS

When covenants benefit only a dozen or so landowners, beneficiaries are unlikely to have much difficulty in consensually agreeing to
modify or terminate the restrictions.'"" When covenant beneficiaries
are more numerous, however, as they commonly are, stale covenants threaten to freeze urban neighborhoods.
Three distinct actors can address this potential rigidity. First, the
attorneys who draft covenants at the behest of developers can explicitly anticipate the issue of staleness. Second, judicial bodies can
create doctrines to limit the enforcement of outmoded covenants.
Third, state legislatures, the chief creators of property law in the
United States, have ample authority to prevent the enforcement of
old restrictions. 107 Each of these three actors is aware of the others'
potential involvement. Susan French, a preeminent scholar of
covenant law, served as the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes.'"" Her Restatement notes that attorneys drafting covenants might, instead of themselves addressing the termination issue, leave "the matter open, anticipating that the law would
extricate their successors from intractable problems that might
arise in the future." 109
105. See HYATT, supra note 34, at 164-65; infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
106. In Cordogan v. Union National Bank of Elgin, 380 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978),
a developer had restricted. lots in a small subdivision to single-family residences. Unable to

sell the lots because of nearby commercial uses, the developer persuaded the City of Elgin to
rezone the land to allow duplexes.Id. at 1196-97. The appellate court refused, however, to find
a change in conditions and held the developer to the covenant. ld. at 1194. Eduardo Peiialver
later discovered that the developer eventually had succeeded in buying out all the covenant
beneficiaries. RoBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKIE BEEN, RoDERICKM. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER
SERKIN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 605 (4th ed. 2013).
107. On the unlikelihood offederal or state constitutional barriers to legislative reform, see
infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
108. I served as an Adviser to this Restatement, a position far less influential than
Reporter.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES§ 7.10 cmt. a (AM.L.INST. 2000); see
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A. How Attorneys Drafting Covenants Have Historically Dealt
with Issues of Amendment and Termination

There have been few studies of what covenants actually provide.
Two scholars have assessed in detail how U.S. covenant schemes
address issues of amendment and termination. Helen Monchow's
survey, published in 1928, and Zigurds Zile's, published in 1959,
each examined no more than one hundred declarations of cove·
nants. 110 Monchow found that most covenants had fixed lives of
thirty to forty years. 111 Zile reported that 58 percent of the covenants
in his sample also had a fixed end date, with a median and mode of
twenty-five years, but that 24 percent were perpetual. 112 Zile also
found that drafters of covenants were beginning to authorize plebiscites among benefited owners. He found that 16 percent embraced
the current predominant approach, automatic renewal with opt·
out. 113 William Rogers, who briefly treated the question of covenant
length in a more recent empirical study, found that owners were
more likely to amend covenants than to terminate them root-and·
branch. 114
Automatic renewal with opt-out, the system pioneered by Bouton
and Nichols (and later endorsed by the FHA and the ULI), puts the
burden of collective action on those who want to amend or terminate
a covenant scheme, not on those who want to perpetuate it. 116 This
also id. § 4.3 cmt. e.
110. Monchow examined eighty-four U .8. covenant schemes, mostly imposed in the 1920s.
MONCHOW, supra note 12. at 27. Just over half originated in four states: California, illinois,
Massachusetts, and New York. ld. at 27-31. Zile's study examined 100 covenant declarations
in Waukesha County, Wisconsin, a locale identified in Part I of his article. Zile, supra note 39.
Most of the covenants in Zile's sample had been recorded in the early 1950s. Id.

111. MONCHOW, supra note 12, at 57-60.
112. Zile, supra note 39, at 459.
113. ld. at 460.
114. See William H. Rogers, A Market for Institutions: Assessing the Impact of Restrictive
Covenants on Housing, 82 LAND ECON. 500, 506 (2006). Rogers, who reviewed covenants in
Weld County, Colorado, devoted only a few sentences to issues of amendment and termination: "Some covenants require 90% agreement to any amendment in the first 10 years and
75% afterwards. Out of 220 covenants, in Weld, since the summer of 2003 only ten have been
terminated, while there have been almost 100 amendments." ld. Rogers did not discuss the
age of the covenant schemes he examined. Cf. NELSON, supra note 88, at 93 (mentioning a
1995 survey that found that 28 percent of CICs had tried to amend their covenants and had
won owner approval in 67 percent of those attempts).
115. ULI's 1964 Homes Association Handbook twice states that requiring owners to vote
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approach often, but not always, has merit. It works to reduce the
transaction costs of decision-making in a community disposed to
renew its covenants. When no opponents appear, the covenants
march costlessly on.
Automatic renewal with opt-out, however, overly protects the
status quo. Researchers such as Clarke and Freedman have found
that most covenants typically lose value after forty years. 116
Individuals who favor perpetuation of existing covenants commonly
control a CIC's executive board. 117 Especially in the face of a supportive board, owners who wish to amend or terminate a covenant
scheme face heavy odds. First, a collective action problem, the
temptation to free ride on the activism of others, is likely to bedevil
them. Second, and as important, most individuals have an innate
preference for maintaining the status quo. Owners, when confronting the question of the amendment or termination of a covenant,
tend to underestimate their gains from removing the restrictions
and exaggerate their losses. 118 Even outmoded covenants therefore
are too likely to march onward.
A drafter of covenants should consider other systems less biased
in favor of the status quo. I start with two possibilities, both with
the virtue of simplicity. First, a drafter could require, after the initial fixed term, that a majority of beneficiaries periodically affirm
the covenants-that is, opt-in, as opposed to opt-out. Second, after
forty or fifty years, the covenant scheme might prohibit specific
performance of any negative covenant, thereby limiting an enforcer
to the remedy of damages. 119 The widespread adoption of either of
these drafting reforms would help unfreeze American neighborhoods.
to renew covenants would be "extremely undesirable." URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 212,
336. "Although most home owners would rather see the covenants continue, a majority vote

to reinstate them may be diff'reult to marshall." ld. at 212. Collective action problems, how-

ever, also beset opponents of stale covenants.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
117. Cf. Fennell, supra note 91, at 841 n.56.
118. See Elli.ckson, supra note 2, at 420-24. Psychologists and economists sometimes refer
to this as status quo bias. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 4 7 EcoNOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979); Daniel Kahneman, Jack
L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 197-98 (1991).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 149-54.
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There also are numerous options of greater complexity. One is
worth spelling out in detail. The drafter of covenants would specify
an initial fixed term, say fifty years, and thereafter require that
beneficiaries vote to amend or terminate every ten years. Unlike
current practice, however, the drafter would periodically place the
burden of affirming the scheme on covenant proponents. An affirmation after the end of the initial term and every thirty years
thereafter might be appropriate. Under this revised approach, mem ·
hers would have to affirmatively vote to endorse continuation of the
covenant scheme in year 50, year 80, year 110, and so on. Opt-outs
would remain available to members in years 60, 70, 90, 100, and so
on. Susan French favors this revised approach. 120 Should a drafter
fail to comply with this recommendation, a state statute could
mandate it.
Any system of neighborhood voting invariably poses other issues.
Should a vote to amend or remove stale covenants require a bare
majority of owners, or some sort of supermajority? Leading authorities now recommend that either action should require a vote of at
least two-thirds of the membership. 121 The Restatement even sees
no problem with requiring 99 percent of owners to assent to a
change. 122 When covenants have become long-lived, these extraordinary majority requirements are a mistake. A drafter of a covenant
scheme would be wise to reduce, as the years pass, the supermajority required. At the end of the initial term, for example, no more
than 60 percent of the electorate should have to favor change, and,
after 80 years, no more than a bare majority. Given the damage that
stale covenants can do to real estate markets, a state legislature
could consider mandating these voting rules.
A related issue is how long prior to the end of the initial term, or
the start of a renewal term, opponents have to act. ULI's 1964
120. In an e-mail message to me on February 20, 2020, she stated that she endorsed the
procedure I propose, citing "our current struggles to build affordable housing."
121. See URB.LANDINST.,supranote 31, at 212; UCIOA § 2-117(a); id. § 2-118(a) (requiring
80 percent to approve a decision to terminate); see also ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAw OF PRoPERTY OWNERS AsSOCIATIONS 633, 698-99 (1989) (providing a sample declaration that would
require 75 percent of owners to agree to modify or terminate).
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10cmt. a (AM.L.INST. 2000)
("H the servitudes provide a means for modification or termination by agreement of less than
100 percent of the servitude beneficiaries, a court should rarely intervene.").
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Handbook favors forcing opponents to take action at least three
years prior to the end of a term. 123 J.C. Nichols, a stalwart proponent of covenants, advocated requiring (in some instances) mobilization five years in advance. 124 Partly because many people are
procrastinators, these approaches also help perpetuate existing
restrictions. 125 Especially for long-lived covenants, drafters should
be less protective of the status quo. One or two years in advance
normally would be sufficient.
Authors of form books for covenants should pay heed to the risk
of straitjacketing neighborhoods. If drafters of covenants do notreform their ways, a state legislature could consider mandating some
of the reforms just mentioned. 126

B. Judicially Created Doctrines That Weed out Stale Covenants
Richard Epstein has contended that the original developer should
solely determine covenant length. In his view, the developer, when
setting the lifespan of a restriction, can best consider all pertinent
variables. 127 Virtually no one, and certainly not the Restatement,
agrees with Epstein's analysis. 128 Stewart Sterk highlights some
rationales for limiting a developer's freedom of covenant. Sterk
stresses that covenants can impose negative externalities on outsiders and notes that a drafter may underestimate the transaction
costs of later consensual modification. 129
123. URB. LAND INBT., supra note 31, at 212, 392. The Handbook also would require that
"written notice of the proposed agreement is sent to every Owner at least ninety {90) days in
advance of any action taken." ld. at 392.
124. See FoGE:r..goN, supra note 6, at 109.
125. See Procrastination Statistics: Interesting and Useful Statistics About Procrastination,
SOLVING PROCRASTINATION, https://solvingprocrastination.com/procrastination-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/BPT4-KHKX].
126. Another reform would reduce the number of owners entitled to enforce a covenant
from the entire set of owners to a much smaller group, namely, the owners of properties near
the site where the breach of covenants was in the offing. See infra text accompanying note
165. Both drafters and legislators could adopt this approach.
127. See Richard A Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1357-58 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 906, 919-26 (1988) (urging authorization of a developer opt-out from the
changed-conditions doctrine).
128. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRoPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7_10(a)·(b) (AM. L.lNBT.
2000) (advocating a mandatory changed-conditions doctrine).
129. See Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 956,
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As the next pages reveal, both courts and legislatures, contrary
to Epstein's urgings, have taken steps to weed out stale covenants.
These lawmakers assume that someone who knows how urban conditions actually have evolved may rightly be able to second-guess
the developer's original judgment about covenant length. Attorneys
who draft covenants, in fact, commonly draft them in the shadow of
these judicial and legislative constraints, and do not assume, a la
Epstein, that freedom of covenant is unfettered.
Many covenants created during the nineteenth century, and even
thereafter, were explicitly or implicitly perpetual.'"" Early on, courts
provided relief to landowners burdened by allegedly outmoded restrictions. State judiciaries developed a number of common law
doctrines to weed out stale covenants. Two warrant emphasis.'"'

1. Changed Conditions
Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, a case that arose in midtown Manhattan, gave rise to the most important ground for judicial
relief: change in neighborhood conditions. 182 In Thacher, an 1859
covenant had restricted uses at the corner of Sixth Avenue and 50th
Street to dwelling houses. Two decades later, an elevated train was
running along Sixth Avenue, with a stop at that exact corner. The
highest New York court refused to order a landowner to honor the
covenant on the ground that neighborhood conditions had changed
sufficiently to make equitable enforcement inappropriate. The court
noted, however, that the beneficiary arguably should be entitled to
recover damages for breach of the covenant. 133
Subsequent case law sheds light on the sorts of neighborhood
change that are particularly salient in the application of this common law doctrine. 134 A leading decision by the Supreme Court of
958-61 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 !OWAL. REv. 615 (1985) [hereinafter Sterk, Freedom from Freedom
of Contract].
130. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
131. For more comprehensive treatments of grounds for covenant termination, see HYA'IT
& FRENCH, supra note 37, at 426-53; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES ch. 7
(AM. L.lNST. 2000).
132. 87 N.Y. 311 (1882) (unanimous).
133. ld. at 319.
134. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of
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Nevada understandably gives more weight to changes in use patterns within the covenanted subdivision than on private lands
across the street from it. 136 Thacher held that a change in transportation options available on public streets might be sufficient to prevent covenant enforcement. This reasoning, however, is not sound
in all instances. If courts were to deem the widening of Wilshire
Boulevard to be a decisive change for lots abutting that thoroughfare in Hancock Park, 136 that neighborhood's covenant scheme might
fall like dominos. 137
The Nevada decision also holds, on a knottier issue, that a
decision of zoning authorities to rezone covenanted lands for more
intense uses is not evidence of a change in conditions. 138 For fresh
covenants, this reasoning typically is sound. It enables lot purchasers to rely on the enforceability of the covenant scheme: controls
that are independent of zoning. As covenants age, however, courts
should be more open to accepting a rezoning as evidence that conditions indeed may have changed. 139
An Albuquerque, New Mexico, case illustrates the point. In that
instance, applicable covenants had banned commercial uses in a
residential subdivision. 140 The declaration authorized the owners to
amend the covenants after twenty years. Residents chafed at the
absence of commercial uses. Twenty-four years after the developer
had first imposed the covenants, 85 percent of the owners approved
an amendment allowing commercial uses on two particular lots.
"Obsolete" Covenants, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 546 (1991).
135. See W. Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624, 626 (Nev. 1972). ULI's 1964 Homes
Aasociation Handbook explicitly criticizes Downs v. Kroeger, 254 P. 1101 (Cal. 1927), in which
the court held that changes in land uses across the street from a covenanted community had
vitiated covenant enforcement. URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 336.
136. See supra Part LA.
137. Compare River Heights Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Batten, 591 S.E.2d 683 (Va. 2004)
(widening of U.S. highway from two to eight lanes held not a sufficient change in conditions),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10, illus. 1, 3 (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(implying that judges sometimes should not enforce covenants along a newly widened corridor
that is attracting heavier traffic).
138. See W. Land Co., 495 P.2d at 627.
139. Judges seldom do this. The Restatement cites fourteen reported decisions in which a
challenger to covenants introduced evidence of a zoning change to support a claim that
conditions had changed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (AM. L.
INST. 2000). The challenger won only one. Zimmerman v. Seven Corners Dev., Inc., 654
N.Y.S.2d 523 (App. Div. 1997) (limiting covenant beneficiaries to an award of damages).
140. Ridge Park Home Owners v. Pena, 544 P.2d 278 (N.M. 1975).
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Importantly, the City of Albuquerque also had agreed to rezone both
lots from single-family to commercial. 141 The New Mexico Supreme
Court nevertheless struck down the covenant amendment because
it did not apply subdivision-wide. A more enlightened decision
would have taken Albuquerque's rezoning as a signal that neighborhood change would be beneficial. 142
A recent American Law Reports annotation includes almost 400
reported cases involving the issue of covenant termination for
changed conditions. 143 Case frequency has declined sharply, from
about seventy per decade in the 1930s and 1940s, to seventeen per
decade in the 2000s and 2010s. One reason may be drafters' disinclinations to make covenants perpetual, and to favor automatic
renewal with opt-out. More ominously, the decline may be evidence
of the increasing ossification of U.S. suburban real estate. 144

2. Waiver
Suppose covenants imposed in 1920 had restricted uses in a
neighborhood of 100 house lots to single-family detached houses. As
time has passed, seventeen scattered lot owners-in violation of the
covenants-have converted their houses to duplexes, and three have
opened commercial businesses. A fact pattern of this sort commonly
induces a court to terminate the covenants. Judges provide a variety
of rationales. They may deem lot owners to have "waived" or "abandoned" the covenants. 145 Given that the use changes were internal
141. See id.
142. In this case, an award of damages might have been sensible. See infra text accom-

panying notes 149-54.
143. See MarkS. Dennison, Annotation, Change in Character of Neighborhood as Affecting

Validity or Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, 76 AL.R. 5th 337 (2000). Ae of January 23,
2020, this Annotation included 394 reported cases, including those in the supplements.
During the 2000s and 2010s, the covenant challenger lost in nearly three-quarters of these

cases.
144. One might expect that judges would be less likely to fmd changed conditions when the
drafter had set an express termination date not far in the offing. The decisional law, however,
is not especially supportive. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hancock, 343 P.2d 959, 961, 966, 969 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (permitting, on account of changed conditions, violation of residential
covenant eleven years prior to its termination date); Norris v. Williams, 64A2d 331, 334 (Md.
1947) (holding a restriction with an express life of :fifty years terminated after thirty).

145. See, e.g., B.B.P. Corp. v. Carroll, 760 P.2d 519 (Alaska 1988) (holding that lot own·

ers had abandoned covenant requiring removal of trees, but perhaps not covenant against
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to the subdivision, a court also could hold that conditions had
changed, a doctrine just discussed.
However justified termination of these covenants might be ex
post, this approach has a definite downside ex ante. The waiver
doctrine tends to prompt homeowners associations to enforce all
covenants strictly, forbidding "indoor cats," for instance, under the
aegis of a no-pets policy. 146 Worried about judicial findings of waiver,
J.C. Nichols himself had urged the strict enforcement of covenants.147 In the eyes of many commentators, this has made life in a
covenanted community overly regimented. 148

3. The Advantages of a Damage Award for Breach of Covenant
As the Thacher court noted as early as 1882, courts have a way to
split the baby when an owner breaches a covenant. 149 In the
Albuquerque case, Ridge Park Home Owners, the court considered
only two options: either upholding or invalidating the covenant
amendment that would have introduced commercial uses into a
single-family neighborhood. 160 The court instead could have held the
sponsors of the new commercial uses liable in damages to the objecting neighbors for diminutions in the market values of their
properties. This approach would have loosened the covenant straitjacket, which is what most of the Albuquerque homeowners wanted
in that instance. It also would have acknowledged the special suffering of the owners of the houses abutting the new commercial uses.

view-blockage); Antis v. Miller, 524 So. 2d 71, 74-76 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that twentyyear failure to object to multifamily uses had resulted in abandonment of entire covenant
scheme). But see Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 814-15 (Utsb 2000) (holding that installation of small storage sheds on nineteen of fifty-two lots did not prevent lot owner from enforcing restriction on location of a somewhat larger secondary structure). The Restatement
prefers the term "abandonment" and, in comment b, offers a distinction between waiver and
abandonment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PEoPERTY: SERVITUDES§ 7.4 (AM. L. lNST. 2000).
146. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
147. Nichols, supra note 59, at 139. In 1964, the ULI invoked this rationale to urge "prompt
action" to enforce all covenants. URB. LAND INST., supra note 31, at 297-98. But see Fennell,
supra note 91, at 849-64 (emphasizing the "problem of uniform rules").
148. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
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Numerous commentators have urged courts, in appropriate cases,
to use damages as the remedy for covenant breach.' 51 Yet courts
rarely opt for this compromise. A review of changed-conditions cases
between 2000 and 2019 indicates that attorneys seldom push for
damages and that courts rarely award them. 152 A Massachusetts
statute, however, commendably recognizes the merits of damages as
a remedy. 153
The standard measure of damages is diminution in the market
value of a covenant beneficiary's land. This formula fails to recognize the possibility that a complainant may have subjectively perceived a greater loss. A party who deliberately breaches a covenant
intentionally inflicts damage. In some instances of this stripe, legislatures have used multipliers to increase damage awards. 154 They
might consider doing so in these cases as well.

C. Statutes That Limit Covenant Enforcement
A handful of state legislatures have taken decisive steps to terminate aged covenants. 155 Charles Clark, the premier American
legal scholar of covenant law in the first half of the twentieth
century, favored the passage of a statute whose effects, contrary to
his intentions, would have been ham-handed. He urged legislation
151. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 33, at 1535-39; French, supra note 37, at 1317-18;
supra note 69, at 83; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 8.3(1) (AM. L. !NST. 2000); St. Lo Const. Co. v. Koenigsberger, 174 F.2d 25,28-30 (D.C. Cir.
1949) (Edgerton, J., dissenting).

Winokur,

162. On January 23, 2020, I examined the thirty-four changed-conditions cases decided in
the 2000s and 2010s included in the supplements to theAL.R. 5th annotation. See supra note
143. Thirty-two did not discuss the possibility of damages as a remedy. Cf. Robinson, supra
note 134, at 549 n.lO (finding one-seventh of changed-conditions cases referred to damages
as a possible remedy).
153. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Head v. Arooskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 10n.1 (1885) (citing New Hampshire
statute that awarded a victim of intentional flooding 150 percent of market damages); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-560 (2020) (awarding victim of intentional taking of timber at least three
times loss of market value).
155. Overviews of the various statutes include Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract,
supra note 129, at 654-56; Note, Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 IIARv. L. REV. 938, 953 n.85 (2009) [hereinafter Note, Touch
and Concern]. By one count, at least five states have statutes that terminate covenants that
have ceased conferring substantial benefits on the party seeking enforcement. French, supra
note 37, at 1318 n.264.
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to limit the life of a covenant to thirty years, or an even shorter
period once the covenant had ceased conferring substantial benefits
on beneficiaries. 156 Clark asserted, "[t]he clog on titles which useless
servitudes may offer is known to all, though, like the weather, we
talk about it but do nothing." 157 Contrary to Clark's analysis,
Louisburg Square and many other developments illustrate that
covenants can have value for more than a century. 158 Minnesota
mistakenly once followed Clark's advice and limited covenant lives
to thirty years. 159 Georgia legislators made a similar error. In a
statute now considerably modified, Georgia once limited the duration of a servitude to twenty years in areas governed by zoning
laws. 160 Although the Georgia enactment correctly detected the
interrelationship between public and private land-use controls, it
overlooked the advantages of authorizing developers to tailor their
own long-lasting rules. 161
Massachusetts legislators have acted more soundly. They have
restricted the life of a covenant to thirty years, but authorize 50
percent of the restricted owners to affirmatively vote to extend the
term. 162 This reform has two virtues. It recognizes that stale
156. See Charles E. Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 AB.A. J. 737, 737, 739, 741
(1941). Clark's proposed statute also would have limited the lives of most easements. A
negotiation over easement termination, however, is far less likely to pose collective action
problems.
157. ld. at 738.
158. See supra text accompanying note 31.
159. See MINN. STAT. § 500.20(2) (1980); Haugen v. Peterson, 400 N.W.2d 723, 725-26
(Minn. 1987). In 1982, Minnesota repealed this provision for CICs and certain other covenants. MINN. STAT § 500.20 (2020). But Minnesota continues, as Clark had suggested, tc
terminate covenants once they confer only nominal value. ld. § 500.20(1); cf. R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 34-4-21 (2020) (limiting to thirty years the lives of virtually all covenants that are facially
perpetual); Note, Touch and Concern, supra note 155, at 953 (urging that lives of covenants
be limited to thirty years, but authorizing beneficiaries to unanimously extend or modify
them).
160. See GA. CoDE ANN. § 29-301 (1981), applied in McKinnon v. Neugent, 167 S.E.2d 593
(Ga. 1969).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
162. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 184, § 27(b) (2020) (applicable only when the number of bound
lots is four or more); see Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract, supra note 129, at 658-59
(analyzing this statute and arguing that perhaps only 30 percent or 40 percent of the
electorate should have to approve extension of a covenant term). But cf. Michael A Heller,
The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1185 (1999) (criticizing voting rules
that give excessive veto power to minorities of unit owners). Why reject majority rule in this
context?
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covenants indeed can impose significant costs and that status quo
bias tends to perpetuate the familiar. Once covenants have become
aged, a legislature is wiser to place the burden of collective action,
as Massachusetts has, on covenant proponents, not covenant opponents.163 A second Massachusetts statute splendidly recognizes that
an award of damages, especially after decades have passed, can be
a useful compromise between the interests of those who want covenants to continue and those who want to be free of them. 164
James Winokur has suggested an alternative way to defang damage from overly restrictive covenants. He has proposed a statute
that, after twenty years, would limit the number of lot owners entitled to enforce to the eleven closest to the site. 166 This reform
would shift enforcement powers away from the many, including the
executive board, to a smaller group better able to work out a compromise. No state has taken up Winokur's innovative idea.
Constitutional issues lurk. A court conceivably might deem a
statute that terminated covenants earlier than the drafter had
intended to be an unconstitutional taking of the property of a covenant beneficiary.'"" A state or federal court ruling of this sort is
highly unlikely.'67 Stale covenants freeze neighborhoods and potentially reduce housing supply. 168 Just as a state legislature has
broad authority to override local zoning decisions, it has wide berth
to override covenants. 169 California, for example, has largely
163. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20. A Louisiana statute, when a covenant
scheme has failed to provide procedures for modification and termination, authorizes owners

of a majority of affected land to amend or terminate covenants fifteen years after their
creation. LA. CIV. ConE ANN. art. 780 (2019). This provision sensibly recognizes the potential

obsolescence of restrictions. Unlike Massachusetts, however, Louisiana places the burden of
collective action on covenant opponents.
164. MAss GEN. LAws ch. 184, § 30 (2020), applied in Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903
(Mass. 1974); see also N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 1951(2) (2020) (authorizing, in some instances,
extinguishment of a covenant upon payment of damages). See generally Abraham Bell &

Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MicH. L. REV.1 (2002) (reviewing advantages of

various legal remedies).
165. See Winokur, supra note 69, at 79-80.

166. See Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 917-21 (Quirico, J., dissenting).
167. If brought under the federal Constitution, the sole remedy of a successful takings

claimant would be an award of damages, not invalidation of the offending statute. See First

Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
168. See French, supra note 37, at 1265.
169. Cf. Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 907·10 (rejecting dissenters' argument that failure to

specifically enforce covenant had constituted a taking of property).
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preempted not only zoning restrictions that impair the building of
accessory dwelling units (ADUs), but also covenants that have the
same effect. 170 Some state statutes similarly have overridden singlefamily-only covenants that bar the opening of group homes. 171
California and other states confronting a severe housing shortage
might even consider across-the-board invalidation of single-familyonly covenants. That step would foster, at least where zoning also
was not a barrier, the construction of "missing middle" units such
as duplexes. 172 There is a partial precedent for this step. A 2019
Oregon statute overrode single-family zoning in the state's most
populous cities and suburbs. 173 Oregon declined, however, to invalidate existing covenants that bar missing-middle housing. It
chose to grandfather existing single-family-only covenants, but did
prohibit developers from imposing new ones. 174
Texas has enacted various statutes that, instead of overriding
covenants, affirmatively promote their use. 175 Houston's reluctance
to adopt zoning may have prompted legislation of this sort. One
Texas statute authorizes selected municipalities, among them the
City of Houston, to deny a building permit for a commercial use that
would violate a private covenant. 176 This shifts covenant-enforcement costs from property owners to taxpayers. A second statute
authorizes at least 75 percent of covenant beneficiaries in certain
cities and counties, including Houston's Harris County, to vote to
extend, add to, or modify existing restrictions. 177 While covenants
170. CAL. CIV. CoDE§ 4751 (West 2020) (overriding covenants that unreasonably restrict

ADUs). See generally John Infranca. The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption amid a
Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 857 ·70 (2019) (emphasizing zoning overrides).

171. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1566.5 (West 2020) (applicable only to post1978 covenants). See generally Dirk Hubbard, Note, Group Homes and Restrictive Covenants,
57 UMKC L. REV. 135 (1988).
172. See In:franca, supra note 170, at 851-52.
173. See OR. REV. STAT.§ 94.776 (2019).
174. Seeid.
175. Hat-tip to Andrew Kull. According to one estimate, covenants constrain land uses in
about two-thirds of Houston. See Archie Henderson, Land Use Controls in Houston: What
Protection for Owners of Restricted Property?, 29 S. TEx. L. REV. 131, 146 n.84 (1987).
176. TEX. Loc. Gov'TCODE § 214.161-.168 (2014); see Berry, supro note 8, at 262-63; Teddy
M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in Houston Contradicts the City's Free Market Reputation, 34
ENV'T L. REP. 10045, 10050-51 (2004).
177. See TEX. PROP. CoDE§§ 201.006(b), 204.003(b)(1) (2020); see also Kapur, supra note
176, at 10051-52. Compare Brandwein v. Serrano, 338 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196-97 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(refusing to allow extension of covenant term that sixty-two of seventy-three owners had
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certainly can be useful tools, this second Texas statute is overly procovenant. Imagine that California had an equivalent statute. In
upscale Hancock Park, where single-family-only covenants expired
in 1970, 75 percent of lot owners might well have voted to keep the
lots along Wilshire Boulevard "dead" for additional decades. 178
Massachusetts has addressed the problem of stale covenants far
more appropriately than Texas. 179 This should puzzle political scientists. Exclusionary zoning has been vastly more prevalent in
Massachusetts than Texas. 180
CONCLUSION

Institutional arrangements, once adaptive, may become outmoded. A central historical example is the open-field village, predominant in most of Europe for the millennium after A.D. 800. 181 In
England and elsewhere, villagers eventually enclosed their open
fields, either consensually or by act of Parliament. An enclosure
permanently subdivided an arable open field into private parcels. In
England, the promoters of enclosures typically emerged spontaneously, village by village. 182 Although historians have hotly debated
the fairness of the enclosure movement, most rural residents appear
to have recognized the greater efficiency of the new arrangement. 183
Aging covenanted communities, like aging open-field villages, are
ripe for institutional change. Urban economists find that, after as
few as forty years, the costs of covenants commonly come to exceed
approved), with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 780 (2019).
178. See supra Part I.A.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64, 175-77. A California statute mimics Texas
by authorizing a majority of owners repeatedly to extend expired covenants, but only in a
common-interest community. See CAL. CIV. CoDE §§ 4265, 4270 (West 2020); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF i'ROPESTY: SESVITODES § 6.10(1)(a)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2000). Because
Hancock Park is not a CIC, this statute would not apply to it.
180. See Infranca, supra note 170, at 855 (Massachusetts); Ellickson, supra note 41, at
1667-85 (Texas).
181. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALEL.J. 1315, 1388-92 (1993); Heory
E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STOD.
131, 132 (2000).
182. FraokA. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure Acts, 10 J. LEGAL HIST. 45, 49-50
(1989).
183. See Elli.ckson, supra note 181, at 1392.
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their benefits. 184 Covenant enthusiasts-such as Edward Bouton,
J.C. Nichols, and Byron Hanke--were innocent of these findings,
discovered long after their lifetimes. Consider a Florida commoninterest community established in 1980. By the year 2100, its aging
buildings and land uses may both be obsolete. The attorneys who
draft covenants, state courts, and state legislatures should anticipate this risk. They also should be aware that humans' status quo
bias tends to lock in institutional arrangements.
For two reasons, however, the covenant straitjacket is likely to
prove not as constraining as the zoning straitjacket. In 2018,
common-interest communities in the United States contained an
average of eighty dwelling units, far fewer than most municipalities.'"" A small community is relatively closely knit, abetting cooperation among members.'"" Promoters of covenant reform in these
communities are likely to emerge spontaneously, as they did in
open-field villages. As in that case, the weeding out of an obsolete
arrangement promises to enhance aggregate property value. 187
In addition, both state courts and legislatures, despite their
spotty record on covenant issues, are likely to be more helpful than
they have historically been on zoning issues. When a zoning reform
is proposed, state institutions commonly succumb to suburbs' concerns about infringements on local autonomy.'"" Both state courts
and state legislatures, by contrast, have less reason to sympathize
with owners who are seeking to perpetuate outmoded covenants.
The politics of exclusionary zoning tend to be far more challenging
than the politics of stale covenants.
Nonetheless, the rigidity ofland uses in much of urban America
creates colossal problems. This inflexibility harms the national
184. See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
186. See supra note 92.
186. See supra note 106 (recounting successful bargaining within a small subdivision).
187. There are shards of evidence that CICs indeed can succeed in revising their covenants.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text; Rogers, supra note 114, at 506 (finding that
around 40 percent of covenant schemes in Weld County, Colorado, had been amended).
188. Compare Thomas F. Bergin, Price-Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47 ST.
JoliN's L. REv. 1, 56 (1972) (stressing value of '1ocal decisional autonomy'), with David
Schleicher, Constitutional Law for NIMBYs: A Review of "Principles of Home Rule for the 21st
Century" by the National League of Cities, 81 Omo ST. L.J. 883, 886-89 (2020) (criticizing
unconstrained local government discretion).
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economy, inflates housing costs, and inhibits internal migration.'""
Although public land use controls have been the primary cause,
private covenants unquestionably also have contributed. Lawmakers should recognize that covenants commonly have value while in
their teens, but not in their dotage. 190

189. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation,
127 YALE L.J. 78, 102-03 (2017) (summarizing various scholarly fmdings).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.

